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  1 
Applying the Rule of Reason to Two–Sided 
Platform Businesses 
David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee* 
In recent years, the federal courts’ analysis of the competitive 
effects of conduct challenged under the Sherman Act’s rule of 
reason, which generally includes market definition as a critical 
step, has been properly guided by sensitivity to business reality 
and sound economic analysis of the conduct at issue. When it 
comes to two–sided platforms, the courts should adhere to that 
same flexible but principled approach and avoid rigid alternatives 
that would apply regardless of the platform, conduct, or fact–
pattern. 
In  Ohio v. American Express Co., (Case No. 16–1454), now 
before the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Department of Justice as 
well as some law professors1 and economists2 wrote as amici in 
support of the Petitioners. They proposed analytical frameworks 
that would, first, require courts to restrict the relevant antitrust 
market to the side of the platform that is the subject of the 
                                                                                                         
*  Professor Evans is Chairman of Global Economic Group. He has been, since 2004, a 
Visiting Professor at University College London, where he is Co–Director of the Jevons 
Institute for Competition Law and Economics. He has a Ph.D. in Economics from the 
University of Chicago. Professor Schmalensee is Dean Emeritus and Howard W. Johnson 
Professor of Management Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
Sloan School of Management and Professor of Economics Emeritus at the MIT Department 
of Economics. He has a Ph.D. in Economics from MIT. This article draws heavily on an 
amicus brief the authors submitted to the Supreme Court on January 23, 2018 in support 
of respondents in State of Ohio v. American Express Co., (Case No. 16–1454). The authors 
are indebted to Elai Katz, Landis C. Best, and Helena S. Franceschi for useful comments 
on that brief, though the views expressed there and here are the authors’ alone. 
1 Brief of 28 Professors of Antitrust Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Ohio 
v. American Express Co., U.S. (argued Feb. 26, 2018) (No. 16–1454) [hereinafter Brief of 
Law Professors Supporting Petitioners].  
2 Brief for John M. Connor et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Ohio v. 
American Express Co., U.S. (argued Feb. 26, 2018) (No. 16–1454) [hereinafter Brief for 
Economists Supporting Petitioners].  
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challenged conduct3 and, second, to then exclude the impact of the 
conduct on the other side of the platform for the purposes of 
establishing anticompetitive effects under the first stage of the rule 
of reason inquiry.4 
Such a rigid approach could lead courts, and possibly require 
them, to ignore business reality, sound economics, and fact 
patterns in analyzing alleged anticompetitive conduct by platform 
enterprises and defining relevant antitrust markets. Following this 
approach could result in tribunals wrongly exonerating behavior 
that is anticompetitive or wrongly condemning behavior that is 
not.  This approach should be rejected in favor of accounting for 
the business realities of two–sided platforms just as the courts 
have generally done for enterprises. 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 3
II. TWO–SIDED PLATFORMS SERVE CUSTOMERS WITH 
INTERDEPENDENT DEMANDS .......................................................... 5
III. FOCUSING ON ONLY ONE SIDE OF A PLATFORM CAN RESULT IN 
FALSE NEGATIVES AND FALSE POSITIVES ....................................... 7
IV. THE RISK OF ERROR IS HEIGHTENED WHEN A PLATFORM 
PROVIDES A SERVICE THAT IS JOINTLY AND UNSEVERABLY 
CONSUMED BY TWO TYPES OF CUSTOMERS .................................... 9
V. AS USUAL, MARKET DEFINITION SHOULD INCLUDE SUPPLIERS 
THAT PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT COMPETITIVE CONSTRAINTS ............ 12
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 15
                                                                                                         
3 See Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 35–40, Ohio 
v. American Express Co., U.S. (argued Feb. 26, 2018) (No. 16–1454) [hereinafter Brief for 
the United States]; Brief of Law Professors Supporting Petitioners, supra note 1, at 17–20; 
Brief for Economists Supporting Petitioners, supra note 2, at 30–31.  
4 See Brief for the United States, supra note 3, at 43–47; Brief of Law Professors 
Supporting Petitioners, supra note 1, at 20–27; Brief for Economists Supporting 
Petitioners, supra note 2, at 30–31. The amici law professors and economists that support 
Petitioners would further exclude consideration of procompetitive benefits on the other 
side of the platform in the second stage of the rule of reason inquiry. See Brief of Law 
Professors Supporting Petitioners, supra note 1, at 32–34; Brief for Economists Supporting 
Petitioners, supra note 2, at 23. We note that the Justice Department does not go to this 
extreme. It argues that the courts should consider procompetitive benefits on the other side 
of the platform in the second stage of the rule of reason analysis. Brief for the United States, 
supra note 3, at 52.  




The case of Ohio v. American Express Co., (No. 16–1454) (hereinafter 
AmEx), now before the U.S. Supreme Court, raises fundamental issues 
regarding the proper application of the Sherman Act’s rule of reason to 
platform enterprises that, like American Express, connect different types 
of customers with interdependent demands – merchants and consumers in 
the case of AmEx.  In submissions to the Supreme Court in AmEx, the U.S. 
Department of Justice and some law professors and economists, as amici 
curiae in support of Petitioners, propose to require courts in such cases to 
restrict the relevant antitrust market to the side of the platform that is the 
subject of the challenged conduct,5 and then to exclude the impact of the 
conduct on the other side of the platform for the purposes of establishing 
anticompetitive effects under the first stage of the rule of reason inquiry.6 
This approach would apparently apply to all platform enterprises, for 
all possible challenged conduct, and for all possible fact patterns. It would 
be a substantial departure from the courts’ long–standing emphasis on 
understanding business reality and employing sound economic analysis.  
Since platform enterprises are a large and growing portion of the economy, 
adopting this rigid framework would fundamentally transform the rule of 
reason.  And, as we show below, it would lead to condemnation of 
procompetitive conduct in some cases and exonerating anticompetitive 
conduct in other cases. 
The risk of error from ignoring customers on one side of a platform 
during the first stage of the rule of reason analysis is heightened for 
platforms that provide services that, by their very nature, are jointly and 
unseverably consumed by two different types of customers.7 In these 
cases, the platform can charge either or both types of customers for the 
                                                                                                         
5 See Brief for the United States, supra note 3, at 35–40; Brief of Law Professors 
Supporting Petitioners, supra note 1, at 17–20; Brief for Economists Supporting 
Petitioners, supra note 2, at 30–31.  
6 See Brief for the United States, supra note 3, at 43–47; Brief of Law Professors 
Supporting Petitioners, supra note 1, at 20–27; Brief for Economists Supporting 
Petitioners, supra note 2, at 30–31. The amici law professors and economists would further 
exclude consideration of procompetitive benefits on the other side of the platform in the 
second stage of the rule of reason inquiry. See Brief of Law Professors Supporting 
Petitioners, supra note 1, at 32–34; Brief for Economists Supporting Petitioners, supra note 
2, at 23. We note that the Justice Department does not go to this extreme. It argues that the 
courts should consider procompetitive benefits on the other side of the platform in the 
second stage of the rule of reason analysis. Brief for the United States, supra note 3, at 52. 
7 Examples include online marketplaces, stock exchanges, dating businesses, 
messaging platforms, and payment networks. 
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service that both consume jointly in order to recover the platform’s costs 
and make a profit. A restaurant reservation service, for example, provides 
a valuable service only when it enables a person wishing to dine at a 
restaurant to make a reservation and a restaurant to take that reservation 
from that prospective diner. The reservation service can charge the diner, 
the restaurant, or both for this service. 
To determine whether a restraint is anticompetitive, where, as in the 
restaurant reservation example, the platform’s matching services are joint 
and unseverable, the presumption at the first stage of the rule of reason 
should be to consider the impact on both sets of customers, on how much 
they jointly pay, and, ultimately, on the overall output of the jointly 
consumed service.8 Conduct that increases the overall output of a service 
should be commended, not condemned, as that is a central virtue of 
competition.9 
This is not a matter of burden shifting. There is simply no way to 
know, especially in the case of a platform that provides a service that 
customers on each side consume jointly, whether a practice is 
anticompetitive without at least considering both types of customers and 
the overall competition among platforms. That analysis must, therefore, 
happen at the first stage of the rule of reason to assess whether the conduct 
is anticompetitive or not. 
The assertion by the AmEx Petitioners and some of the amici in 
support that the relevant antitrust market for a two–sided platform always 
includes the side of the platform on which the conduct has occurred and 
always excludes the other side of the platform conflicts with sound 
economics. This assertion is clearly wrong for platforms that provide 
services that are jointly consumed, and unseverable, by the customers on 
each side. In such cases, there is a single service that is subject to 
competition, and it is that service that is interchangeable among the 
customers that use it. For example, while the benefits that diners and 
restaurants each obtain from an online reservation service are not 
reasonably interchangeable, the service they jointly consume is reasonably 
                                                                                                         
8 As is always the case with the rule of reason, the inquiry ultimately concerns the 
impact of the conduct on the market price and output. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents 
of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984) (calling higher prices and lower output 
“hallmarks of anticompetitive behavior”). 
9 Some amici economists even want to discourage the courts from looking at the 
standard signals of competitive harm—price and output—because, despite received 
antitrust doctrine, they contend that lower prices and higher output may be undesirable. 
That would eliminate the main navigational tool that the courts have used with great 
success in rule of reason inquiries. Those amici economists would have the courts wade 
into the sea of two–sided platforms without a compass for the rule of reason. See Brief for 
Economists Supporting Petitioners, supra note 2, at 20, 34–35. 
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interchangeable with services provided by other online restaurant 
reservation services. 
In submissions to the Supreme Court in AmEx, some law professors, 
economists, and the U.S. Department of Justice, all as amici, write as if 
they are asking the Court to conduct rule of reason business as usual. In 
fact, they are insisting that the courts always view all platform enterprises 
through a uniquely narrow and distorted lens. The Court should reject this 
request and, instead, take business reality and the facts on the ground into 
account in applying the rule of reason to two–sided platforms, as courts do 
in cases involving all other enterprises. There will be matters—especially 
involving platforms that provide joint and unseverable matching 
services—in which, to minimize errors, the courts will need to consider 
both sides of a platform. There will also be some cases in which it may be 
possible to address certain issues by considering only one side of a 
platform. 
II. TWO–SIDED PLATFORMS SERVE CUSTOMERS WITH 
INTERDEPENDENT DEMANDS 
Two–sided platforms enable two distinct types of participants to 
interact more readily and realize gains from trade or other interaction.10 
They provide each customer group with access to the other customer 
group. The key technical feature is that the demand for the platform service 
by each type of participant depends on the demand for the platform service 
by the other type of participant as a result of externalities between the two 
types of participants.11 It now is generally recognized in industrial 
organization economics and business strategy that the interdependency of 
demand for the two customer groups can have significant economic 
ramifications. 
The relevant literature, which started in 2000 with the circulation of a 
working paper version of Rochet and Tirole’s seminal contribution, 
encompasses hundreds of published papers, several major books, and is a 
                                                                                                         
10 Two–sided platforms are a special case of multisided platforms, which can serve two 
or more distinct groups of customers. We consider two–sided platforms here to simplify 
the discussion but the analysis applies to platforms with more than two sides. 
11 The amici economists supporting Petitioners note that the fact that raising the price 
on one side of a platform decreases demand on the other side is similar at the level of 
abstract theory to the relation between prices and demands for complements, like tennis 
racquets and tennis balls. See Brief for Economists Supporting Petitioners, supra note 2, at 
4–5. This neglects a fundamental difference in business reality between the two situations: 
a platform must serve both its sides because it is in the business of connecting them, while 
many businesses sell one complement (tennis balls) but not the other complement (tennis 
racquets). 
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standard and noncontroversial part of the modern industrial organization 
literature.12 The basic insights of the economic literature are now widely 
discussed in nontechnical books and media, have diffused widely through 
the business world, and are applied in business decisions.13 
Potential platform participants often make two distinct decisions. 
They decide whether or not to join a platform so that they have the option 
to use it. In the case of a ride–sharing service, drivers have to sign on to 
drive for the service, and passengers need to install an app and set up an 
account. Having joined a platform, participants make decisions on how 
much to use it, drivers have to decide how much to drive for a particular 
service, and passengers have to decide how many rides to take on that 
service. 
For each set of participants, a platform may independently establish 
access prices (for joining the platform) and transaction prices (for using 
it). The economic theory of two–sided platforms shows that profit–
maximizing access and transaction prices can be less than the marginal 
cost of provision – even zero or negative – subject to at least some of these 
prices being sufficiently above marginal cost so that the platform earns a 
profit. These access and transaction prices affect the overall use of the 
platform. How they do so depends on the structure of demand for the 
participants to join the platform and to use the platform after having joined. 
It is common, though certainly not universal, for two–sided platforms to 
lose money on one side of the platform. 
Beyond this basic description, two–sided platforms, like traditional 
enterprises, are diverse. The courts will see many platforms that bear little 
apparent similarity to the credit–card network at issue in this matter. That 
is apparent from comparing credit–card networks to newspapers and both 
to ride–sharing services. 
                                                                                                         
12 See United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(Williams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (referring to “the vast scholarly 
treatment” of two–sided markets). 
13 For key theoretical contributions, see generally Jean–Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 
Platform Competition in Two–Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003); Jean–
Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two–Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 
645 (2006); Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two–Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668 
(2006); and E. Glen Weyl, A Price Theory of Multi–Sided Platforms, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 
1642 (2010). For nontechnical surveys, see generally Marc Rysman, The Economics of 
Two–Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 125 (2009) and David S. Evans & Richard 
Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multisided Platform Businesses, 1 OXFORD 
HANDBOOK INT’L ANTITRUST ECON. 404 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2014). 
The online appendix to the latter paper lists over 350 significant economic articles 
published through December 2012 (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2185373). The Harvard Business Review has been publishing articles for managers on 
two–sided platforms since 2006. See Thomas Eisenmann, Geoffrey Parker, & Marshall W. 
Van Alstyne, Strategies for Two–Sided Markets, 84 HARV. BUS. REV. 92 (2006). 
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The diversity of platform enterprises, however, is not fundamentally 
different from the diversity of single–sided enterprises and does not pose 
any challenge the courts have not successfully met before. This diversity 
is certainly not a basis for requiring courts to ignore information that may 
be relevant to a sound assessment of whether challenged conduct is 
anticompetitive or not. 
III. FOCUSING ON ONLY ONE SIDE OF A PLATFORM CAN RESULT 
IN FALSE NEGATIVES AND FALSE POSITIVES 
The Court’s decision in Times–Picayune, relied on by AmEx 
Petitioners, illustrates how different modes of analysis can make 
economic sense in practice, depending on the violation alleged, the 
specific issue considered, and the facts on the ground.14 
The issue presented to the Court was whether a newspaper publisher, 
with a two–sided platform for readers and advertisers, engaged in a 
Sherman Act Section 1 tying violation by requiring advertisers to place 
ads in one publication as a condition of placing ads in another 
publication.15 The Court disposed of the issue based on its finding that 
advertisers had sufficient choices of where to place ads so that the business 
leverage necessary for an anticompetitive tie was absent.16 There was no 
apparent reason to examine the impact of the tie on readers to assess 
whether there was an antitrust violation involving tying, given the Court’s 
treatment of tying at that time.17 Moreover, for the purposes of assessing 
whether the newspaper publisher had the bargaining leverage to impose an 
anticompetitive tie, it was sufficient to consider only competition for 
advertising.18 
In contrast, in analyzing whether the newspaper publisher engaged in 
predation in violation of Sherman Act Section 2, the district court 
examined whether the platform as a whole—taking both readers and 
advertisers into account—was operating at a loss.19 The district court 
                                                                                                         
14 See Times–Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). 
15 Id. at 596. 
16 Id. at 611–13. 
17 One could imagine other sets of facts that would make it necessary to consider both 
sides for a full understanding of anticompetitive and procompetitive effects in tying cases. 
18 Times–Picayune Publishing Co., 345 U.S. at 611. 
19 See Brief for the United States, supra note 3, at 38–39; see also United States v. 
Times–Picayune Publishing Co., 105 F. Supp. 670, 677 (E.D. La. 1952) (evaluating 
arguments about allocating “revenues and expenses” from both “advertising and 
circulation” in determining whether one of the defendant’s two papers “was operated at a 
loss”). 
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compared revenue from both sides and the costs on both sides.20 This two–
sided arithmetic helped support the district court’s conclusion that there 
was no Section 2 violation, which the Supreme Court accepted without 
criticism.21 Since newspapers typically lose money on the reader side 
while making money on the advertising side, it would ignore business 
reality and make no economic sense to look at either side in isolation for 
predation analysis purposes. 
Predatory pricing makes particularly clear how the failure to account 
for the interdependent demand between the two sides can result in a 
tribunal concluding that conduct is anticompetitive when it plainly is not 
(a false positive), and finding that conduct is not anticompetitive when it 
plainly is (a false negative). 
A tribunal could reach a false positive conclusion if it found predatory 
pricing based on the platform charging a below–cost price on one side.22 
That is common profit–maximizing behavior for two–sided platforms 
even when they operate in competitive industries. A French commercial 
court made that mistake in finding that Google Maps engaged in predatory 
pricing by providing websites with free mapping software.23 A Paris 
Appeals Tribunal reversed, relying on an opinion by the French 
Competition Authority. 24 This opinion, along the same lines as the district 
court’s in Times–Picayune, states that revenue and cost on both sides of 
the platform should be considered.25 
A court could also make a false negative finding. Suppose, contrary to 
the actual facts, that Times–Picayune Publishing had reduced advertising 
                                                                                                         
20 Id. As a matter of economics this approach is equivalent to comparing the overall 
price charged by the platform, based on a weighted average across readers and advertisers, 
and the overall operating costs incurred by the platform, based on a weighted average 
across readers and advertisers. This approach is consistent with the two–sided price–cost 
comparison we recommend in our Oxford Handbook paper. See Evans & Schmalensee, 
supra note 13, at 423–25. 
21 See Times–Picayune Publishing Co., 345 U.S. at 626–27. 
22 For a survey of issues in analyzing predatory pricing cases for two–sided platforms 
see Andrea Amelio, Liliane Karlinger, & Tommaso Valletti, Exclusionary practices and 
two–sided platforms, OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION 
COMM. (Nov. 15, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)34/
FINAL/en/pdf. 
23 Tribunal De Commerce [TC] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Jan. 31, 
2012, Case No. 2009061231. 
24 Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, civ., Nov. 25, 2015, Case No. 
12/02931. 
25 Autorité de la Concurrence [French Competition Authority], Rendu à la Cour D’appel 
de Paris Concernant un Litige Opposant la société Bottin Cartographes SAS aux sociétés 
Google Inc. et Google France [Report to the Paris Court of Appeals Concerning the 
Litigation between Bottin Cartographes SAS and Google Inc. and Google France] ¶ 50 
(Dec. 16, 2014). 
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prices for its evening paper without raising prices to readers and that, 
although the advertising prices were greater than the cost of providing 
advertising, doing so resulted in operating the evening paper at an overall 
loss because of losses on the reader side. Assume further that this pricing 
structure had forced its rival out of business, since the rival could not 
match the lower advertising prices without sustaining large losses, and that 
Times–Picayune Publishing then recouped through higher reader and 
advertiser prices. 
If, in this hypothetical, the district court had defined an advertising–
only market and evaluated the predatory pricing claim based only on 
whether price was greater than cost in that market, then the court would 
have concluded that Times–Picayune Publishing had not engaged in 
predatory pricing when in fact it did. The two–sided approach actually 
adopted by the district court in 1952 would have saved it from making that 
false negative determination. 
False negatives and false positives can arise from any rule of reason 
analysis in which the finder of fact ignores one side of a platform. There 
may be situations in which the interdependence between the two sides of 
a platform is unimportant or can be neglected because of the particular 
issue at hand. As in any rule of reason inquiry, however, the courts should 
analyze the challenged conduct in light of business realities and the overall 
fact pattern before deciding what evidence to consider. 
IV. THE RISK OF ERROR IS HEIGHTENED WHEN A PLATFORM 
PROVIDES A SERVICE THAT IS JOINTLY AND UNSEVERABLY 
CONSUMED BY TWO TYPES OF CUSTOMERS 
For platforms that provide two groups of customers with a service that 
they must consume jointly, and where the challenged conduct necessarily 
affects both types of customers, there is a strong presumption that, as a 
matter of economics, the rule of reason analysis, at the first stage, should 
consider the impact of the challenged conduct on both groups of 
customers. 
Joint consumption is not an essential aspect of the services provided 
by many platforms. For instance, people can watch ad–supported 
television, enjoy the content, and ignore the ads. Although advertisers 
hope that enough consumers will pay attention to their ads to justify the 
cost, content and ads are not necessarily consumed jointly. Providing 
content and providing ads are severable. It is possible to provide content 
without ads, and some consumers are willing to pay for programming 
without ads. As a result, two–sided ad–supported television faces 
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competition from single–sided premium cable channels and streaming 
video providers. 
Some platforms, however, provide a service that, by its very nature, 
must be jointly consumed by two customers and cannot be separately 
provided to one or the other. Consider an equity exchange such as 
Nasdaq. The service involves helping buyers and sellers find each 
other and engage in trades. The service is jointly consumed: the buyer and 
seller agree to terms and then consummate a transaction. The exchange 
service is also unseverable since it is not possible to provide it just to 
buyers or just to sellers. Any enterprise that wants to be in this business 
must provide the service to both groups. 
When a service is jointly provided, a party and a counterparty stand at 
opposite ends of the service.  In some cases, the same platform participants 
could be on either end of the service depending on their circumstances. 
People can, at different times, be both senders and receivers of messages 
on a messaging platform (e.g. WhatsApp) and both senders and receivers 
of funds on a person–to–person money–transfer platform (e.g. Venmo). In 
other cases, the parties and counterparties are necessarily distinct.  
Heterosexual dating platforms (e.g., Match.com) connect members of 
opposite sexes, and payment card networks (e.g., American Express) 
connect cardholders and merchants. 
In all these cases, the platform must decide how to split the cost of the 
service between the parties that consume it jointly and unseverably. 
OpenTable, for example, charges restaurants $1.00 and diners $0.00 for 
reservations made through the platform.26 The price it charges for a 
reservation would still be $1.00 if it charged restaurants $0.75 and diners 
$0.25 for each reservation or any other set of numbers that added up to 
$1.00. 
It would not make economic sense to analyze the conduct of a platform 
that provides a service that is jointly consumed by looking only at what 
customers on one side pay for the service and receive from it. Businesses 
of this sort never provide a transaction to only one side of the service, and 
every interaction has a party and a counterparty that both benefit from the 
service. 
The economic surplus generated by each interaction equals the total 
difference between the values both parties place on the interaction minus 
the total costs they incur. The platform determines the division of this 
surplus between the two sides through the prices it charges each. 
                                                                                                         
26 We have simplified this pricing structure to aid exposition. In fact, OpenTable also 
charges restaurants a monthly access fee and provides reward points to diners based on 
how many reservations they make so diners pay a negative transaction fee. See David S. 
Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided 
Platforms 9–12 (2016). 
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Competition between platforms that provide joint and unseverable 
services, like competition between ordinary single–sided businesses, leads 
to greater economic surplus by encouraging lower prices, better quality, 
and higher output. 
A platform with market power that provides a service that is jointly 
and unseverably consumed could, like any other firm with market power, 
engage in conduct that would harm competition. Evidence on whether the 
challenged conduct has made buyers worse off, or would be likely to do 
so – through some mix of higher prices, lower output, and lower quality – 
would typically be important, or certainly useful, for that assessment. 
Conduct that, at the market level and taking both sides into account, does 
not reduce the quality of the service or raise the total cost of the service 
would ordinarily not reduce total market output or buyers’ surplus.27 
There is a strong presumption that conduct that affects one party to a 
jointly consumed service has an impact on the other party consuming that 
service and sharing its cost. In determining prices to maximize its profits, 
the platform must take the interdependent demands of both parties into 
account. Conduct that affects one side of the jointly consumed service 
necessarily affects the other side. Therefore, it would be necessary to 
consider both sides of the platform that provides the jointly consumed 
service at the first stage of the rule of reason inquiry to determine whether 
challenged conduct has harmed consumers and the competitive process. 
Considering the impact of challenged conduct on both sides of the 
interaction is very different than the usual evaluation of procompetitive 
benefits in the second stage of a rule of reason inquiry in at least two 
different ways. 
First, it is possible that the conduct harms parties on which a restraint 
has not been imposed, and failure to consider both sides of the platform 
involved at the first stage of the rule of reason inquiry could lead to a false 
negative. A job matching platform with market power, for example, might 
require employers to list jobs exclusively with it in exchange for lower 
prices. If this prevented the entry of other job sites, however, the firm 
imposing the constraint could charge higher prices to jobseekers. To 
properly assess whether challenged conduct harms competition, then, the 
first stage of the rule of reason inquiry should consider the impact of the 
                                                                                                         
27 The AmEx Petitioners, and some of the amici in support, claim that the total cost of 
the service to both types of customers is not relevant because competition should determine 
the relative prices to the two sides. See Brief of Law Professors Supporting Petitioners, 
supra note 1, at 20, 23–24; Brief for Economists Supporting Petitioners, supra note 2, at 
15. It is not possible, however, to reliably determine if conduct has harmed competition 
and consumers through a distortion in relative market prices without considering both sides 
of a two–sided platform at the start of the analysis, since competition takes place on both 
sides. 
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conduct on both parties, most naturally by considering the impact on total 
market prices and market output. 
Second, it is possible that the conduct benefits parties on one side of 
the platform. That benefit is part of the economic surplus generated by the 
interaction between the parties and should be accounted for in determining 
whether the practice reduces consumer welfare. Consider a money transfer 
platform that lowered prices to senders so they received a subsidy, and 
increased prices to receivers by a smaller amount, thereby resulting in a 
lower total price, higher demand, and greater output. Its pricing could look 
predatory on the sending side even though this change in pricing structure 
reduced the total price for money transfers and increased the output of 
money transfers. In this example, it is not that there are procompetitive 
benefits that offset anticompetitive effects; rather, there are no possible 
anticompetitive effects to begin with. 
And therein lies the fundamental error in the arguments about 
impermissible balancing put forward by the AmEx Petitioners and amici 
in support. The first stage of the rule of reason analysis involves 
determining whether the conduct is anticompetitive. The economic 
literature on two–sided platforms shows that there is no basis for 
presuming one could, as a general matter, know the answer to that question 
without considering both sides of the platform. 
V. AS USUAL, MARKET DEFINITION SHOULD INCLUDE 
SUPPLIERS THAT PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT COMPETITIVE 
CONSTRAINTS 
Market definition is normally an important step in the analysis of 
competitive effects. The basic principles for determining the relevant 
antitrust market are no different for platform enterprises than they are for 
other enterprises. The relevant antitrust market should consist of the 
suppliers that compete with the firm or firms of primary interest and 
impose significant competitive constraints on that firm or those firms. That 
principle has been at the core of the economic analysis of market definition 
since the early 1980s.28 It is essential that market definition faithfully 
                                                                                                         
28 The modern approach to market definition, with its emphasis on competitive 
constraints rather than mere interchangeability, is generally understood to have begun with 
the U.S. Department of Justice’s 1982 Merger Guidelines. The basic approach in the 
guidelines is generally used by economists. See generally Gregory J. Werden, The 1982 
Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm, 71 
ANTITRUST L.J. 253 (2003); Dennis W. Carlton, Market Definition: Use and Abuse, 3 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3 (2007); Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49 (2010); see also 
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reflect business realities to identify and assess competitive constraints 
from suppliers that compete with the firm or firms of primary interest. 
A firm that operates a two–sided platform faces competitive pressures 
on both sides of the platform that restrain its ability to raise prices or 
restrict output on either side or both sides of the platform.29 Consider, for 
example, competing shopping malls. If one mall decided to reduce its 
subsidy to shoppers—by charging for parking or reducing amenities, for 
example—some of those shoppers would shift their demand to other malls. 
Because of that fall in traffic, the demand by retailers for locating at that 
mall would decline, therefore reducing the rents the mall could charge. 
Competitive pressures on the retailer side therefore constrain the mall’s 
ability to profitably lower the subsidy to shoppers. 
The magnitude of these competitive constraints, however, and the 
relationship to challenged conduct, will vary across matters before the 
courts. Sometimes these cross–side competitive constraints could be 
economically significant, making it a mistake to exclude competition for 
customers on one side from the set of competitive constraints on 
competition for the other side. In other cases, these cross–side competitive 
constraints could be small enough to ignore. In some cases, even though 
these cross–side competitive constraints are significant, it may be 
convenient to proceed at the first stage by assembling the competitive 
constraints separately for each side into two markets and then consider the 
linkages between them.30 In all cases, it is important at the first stage of 
the rule of reason analysis to respect the reality that two–sided platforms 
are in the business of linking their two sides. 
In their filings in AmEx, some amici curiae supporting the Petitioners 
are asking the Court to require, as a matter of law, that the relevant market 
for assessing challenged conduct by all platform enterprises never include 
competition for the customers on the other side of the platform. This rigid 
approach would exclude relevant competitive constraints on the conduct 
at issue, and is therefore inconsistent with modern approaches to market 
definition and basic principles of evidence. It would also prevent the courts 
                                                                                                         
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 44 (2013) (citing the most recent iteration of the 
Merger Guidelines). 
29 For surveys of the economic literature on market definition for two sided platforms 
see generally Lapo Filistrucchi et al., Market Definition in Two–Sided Markets: Theory 
and Practice, 10 J. COMPETITION L. ECON. 293 (2014); Sebastian Wismer & Arno Rasek, 
Market definition in multi–sided markets, OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS 
COMPETITION COMM. (Nov. 15, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/
WD(2017)33/FINAL/en/pdf. 
30 For a discussion of considering linked markets versus a single market see Wismer & 
Rasek, supra note 29, at 4–7. 
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from accounting for the business reality of platform enterprises when it is 
important to do so.  
The fundamental error in imposing this novel limitation on the court 
is most clearly seen for platforms that provide services that are jointly and 
unseverably consumed. In these cases, participants are consuming the 
same service, just standing at different ends. Any enterprise that provides 
the service would have to compete for both types of customers. The value 
of the service to one type of customer depends on their ability to interact 
with the other type of customer. A platform that is more successful at 
attracting one type of customer necessarily makes it harder for its rivals to 
attract the other type of customer. Defining a market that included just one 
type of customer would be inconsistent with business reality, as there is 
no rational competition for one side without the other, and it would ignore 
the competitive constraints coming from competition for both groups. 
The AmEx Petitioners, and the amici in support, base their proposal 
for confining market definition for platform enterprises on two false 
premises. 
The first false premise is that the purpose of market definition is to 
mechanically identify products that are interchangeable. Examining the 
extent to which consumers can substitute the products of different 
suppliers is often an important element in identifying those suppliers that 
should be included in the market because they impose significant 
competitive constraints. However, the analysis of the interchangeability of 
products is not an end in itself.31 It is just a means for helping the court 
identify relevant competitive constraints.32 
The second false premise is that the interchangeability between the 
services received by opposing sides of a platform is somehow relevant for 
assessing competitive constraints. To see the error in their analysis, 
consider competition among person–to–person money transfer services. It 
is true that the service provided to a person who sends money is literally 
                                                                                                         
31 See Werden, supra note 28, at 253; Frank H. Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1, 22 (1984) (“Market definition is just a tool in the investigation of market 
power . . . .”). 
32 It is not uncommon for courts and antitrust authorities to define relevant product 
markets that include products or services that most customers would not consider to be 
reasonable substitutes. For example, the market for hospital services may include heart 
transplants, brain tumor surgery, and appendectomies, which patients and doctors would 
not consider to be interchangeable. See, e.g., FTC v. Penn State Hershey Medical Center, 
838 F.3d 327, 338–45 (3d Cir. 2016) (including local hospitals that constrain the 
defendants’ pricing of general acute care services and incorporating new economic learning 
for determining relevant geographic markets); FTC v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 
F.3d 460, 468, 471–73 (7th Cir. 2016) (including “abdominal surgeries, childbirth, 
treatment of serious infections, and some emergency care” in the relevant product market 
and adopting new economic learning for relevant market definition). 
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different from, and not interchangeable with, the service provided to a 
person who receives money. Defining separate markets for sending money 
and receiving money, however, would ignore the core business reality that 
suppliers compete for transactions between senders and receivers. The 
transactions between senders and receivers are substitutable across 
platforms. An increase in the price of the transaction by one platform—
almost no matter how that price is divided between the sender and receiver 
sides—would tend to result in an increase in demand for other platforms. 
In the cases of platforms that provide a service that is jointly and 
unseverably consumed, the observation that the customers are at different 
ends of the service is irrelevant and should not be used to remove 
important competitive constraints from the relevant market. Platforms that 
provide similar jointly consumed services are substitutes for each other, 
and their products are interchangeable as a matter of business reality. 
Market definition for platforms that provide services that are jointly 
consumed and unseverable should therefore focus on identifying suppliers 
that provide services that are interchangeable in this sense, which typically 
accords with business reality. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The history of the application of the rule of reason shows the 
importance of allowing the courts to consider all economic evidence that 
is potentially relevant for determining whether conduct is anticompetitive 
or not, including new economic learning.33 There is certainly no basis in 
economics for putting special blinders on the courts when it comes to 
considering platform enterprises, as requested by the Petitioners and some 
of their amici in AmEx.  Doing so would be a radical departure from the 
flexible but principled approach that the Court has taken, with great 
success, in applying the rule of reason to a wide variety of businesses, 
conduct, and fact patterns. 
                                                                                                         
33 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889–
91, 897–99 (2007) (citing new economic learning as a justification for ending the per se 
illegality of vertical resale price maintenance agreements, which had been the law for a 
century, and instructing courts to take economic considerations into account when applying 
the rule of reason). 
